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Medical Evidence in Cases of
Intrauterine Drug and Alcohol
Exposure
Judith Larsen; Robert M. Horowitz; and Ira J. Chasnoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years drug and alcohol-exposed infants have added
significantly to the tidal wave of neglect cases sweeping over the fam-
ily courts. Large urban courts report staggering increases in their ju-
venile and family dockets. For example, the New York City Family
Court experienced a 471% increase in neglect filings between 1984
and 1989, mostly attributable to drugs.' In Dade County (Miami), in
1989, 35% of all abuse and neglect petitions filed in the Model Depen-
dency Court involved babies born drug-exposed with crack related
problems.2
In response, many states' legislators have rushed to refurbish old
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1. Committee on Family Court and Family Law and the Committee on Juvenile
Justice, The New York City Family Court, 44 The Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York 865, 866-67 (1989).
2. Conversation with Doris Capri, Court Administrator, Dade County Model De-
pendency Court (March 18, 1991). This court handled 1460 petitions of the 1871 filed in
the county for the calendar year of 1990. Only neglect filings (39%) outnumbered peti-
tions related to drug-exposed newborns.
civil statutes with new drug or alcohol-specific definitions of neglect
and abuse. 3 In other states, very general definitions of neglect and
abuse are being stretched in the courtroom to cover the new
situation.4
Petitions that allege neglect and abuse from the time of birth
(often relating back to impaired fetal development) pose new eviden-
tiary problems for prosecuting and defense attorneys. In the early
stages of a case, there tends to be a reliance on positive urine toxicol-
ogies of the mother and the infant to make the government's case.
However, as both the judiciary and the bar become more aware of
the medical environment in which these cases develop, it is apparent
that positive urine toxicologies are not a sufficient, sole support for a
3. In 1989, the Illinois civil neglect statute was amended to read in pertinent part:
(1) Those who are neglected include:
(c) any newborn infant whose blood or urine contains any amount of a con-
trolled substance as defined in subsection (f) of Section 102 of the Illinois Con-
trolled Substances Act, as now or hereafter amended, or a metabolite of a
controlled substance, with the exception of controlled substances or metabo-
lites of such substances, the presence of which in the newborn infant is the
result of medical treatment administered to the mother or the newborn
infant.
The Indiana civil neglect law states:
A child is a child in need of services if:
(1) The child is born with fetal alcohol syndrome or an addiction to a con-
trolled substance or a legend drug; or
(2) the child...
(C) Is at a substantial risk of a life threatening condition; that arises or is
substantially aggravated because the child's mother was addicted to alcohol, a
controlled substance, or a legend drug during pregnancy; and needs care,
treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving, or that is unlikely
to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1 (Burns 1987). A number of other states have amended
civil neglect statutes to specifically address drugs and alcohol. At this point, no partic-
ular wording or approach predominates.
4. An example of the typical general definition of a neglected child which courts
must adapt to cases involving drug and alcohol impairment can be found in Louisiana
Statutes as follows:
(2) "Neglected child" is a child whose parent or parents, although financially
able to do so, have consistently refused to provide reasonably necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical service ....
(7) "Child in need of care" means a child:
(a) Whose parent inflicts or allows the infliction of physical injury or sexual
abuse upon the child which seriously endangers the physical, mental, or emo-
tional health of the child. (b) Whose physical, mental, or emotional condition
is threatened or impaired as a result of the refusal or neglect of his parent to
supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, or as a
result of the parent's neglect or imposition of cruel punishment.
(c) Who is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care because
of abandonment by, or the disappearance of, his parent.
(d) Who has been placed in the custody of the Department of Health and
Human Resources or other persons for a period of three years due to the par-
ent's mental illness, mental retardation, or substance abuse.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1600 (West Supp. 1991).
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case involving a substance-exposed infant. Some of the reasons why
this is so include the following:
1. Infants can be severely impaired by drugs or alcohol yet
have negative urine toxicologies. This is principally because
urine toxicologies only measure a mother's drug use within a
few days prior to the birth.
2. Urine toxicologies, alone, cannot prove harm to the in-
fant. It is possible for drugs to be in an infant's system with
no observable effect on the infant's health.
3. Urine toxicologies do not indicate the amount of drugs in
the infant's or mother's system, or whether the mother's
drug use was habitual.
4. Urine toxicologies are not the medically-accepted way to
detect alcohol. Blood or breath tests are the ways to deter-
mine alcohol use.
5. Urine toxicologies may show false positives and (more
frequently) false negatives. A positive urine toxicology alone
does not meet scientific standards of accuracy. It needs to be
confirmed by another method, usually gas chromatography/
mass spectrometry.
6. Urine toxicologies do not shed light on the mother's cur-
rent parenting capabilities or on whether the infant is at risk
of future harm due to parental abuse or neglect.
In order for the state to make a civil neglect case, or the parents to
refute it, attorneys must search neonatal nurseries and intensive care
units in hospitals, as well as medical literature, for information that
goes beyond positive urine toxicologies. This article identifies the
kind of evidence found in hospitals and clinics that can reveal, or dis-
prove, infant drug and alcohol exposure.
First, prenatal indicators of drug problems are examined. This sec-
tion, entitled "Fetal Predictors," surveys drug tests, but gives more
emphasis to information that has been less available to attorneys:
medical aspects of both the current pregnancy and past pregnancies
which may raise red flags about drug use.
Second, the section entitled "Evidence of Drugs or Alcohol in the
Neonate's Body," examines the legal differences between drug and
alcohol tests for infants and for their mothers.
Third, the authors look at "Problems in Common to Substance-Ex-
posed Infants" to help attorneys understand what characteristics in a
newborn should be warning signs to the court that some substance-
caused damage may have occurred.
Sections Four, Five and Six make distinctions between neonatal re-
sponses to narcotics, cocaine, and alcohol, as these are the most com-
mon substances litigated in neglect courts.
Section Seven examines releases of confidentiality for medical
records in neglect cases as compared to the protections offered
through drug and alcohol-focused laws.
II. FETAL PREDICTORS
Typically, information about a woman's prenatal use of drugs or al-
cohol becomes important after the infant is born. It is offered as part
of proof that the now-living infant was damaged during its fetal de-
velopment. The issue of when a fetus takes on "personhood" has
been widely discussed, to some extent in the context of civil cases
having to do with drug-exposed infants.5 The most thorough discus-
sions occur in the Roe v. Wade 6 line of cases relating to abortions. At
least one statute,7 and a few cases,8 have attempted to fix civil re-
sponsibility for drug impairment on the mother at the stage of fetal
development. For the most part, however, state civil neglect statutes
continue to define neglect and abuse in terms of damage to the child,
with the result that only living infants can be petitioned successfully.
Courts are often able to establish jurisdiction over a substance-us-
ing pregnant woman through a clause in the civil neglect statute that
may refer to "imminent endangerment of the child" or some similar
phrase.9 The theory of jurisdiction is that the mother's current drug
5. Examples of civil cases include: In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 869 (1989); Department of Soc. Serv. ex rel. Mark S. v. Felicia B., 144 Misc. 2d
169, 543 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d
935 (1986).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.
Ct. 3040 (1989). Law Review articles discussing this issue include: Note, Maternal
Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse", 101
HARv. L. REV. 994, 995-98 (1988); Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions:
What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 10-21 (1987); McNulty,
Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant
Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 276-88
(1987-88); Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Caesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951, 1989-94 (1986); Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal
Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600-09 (1986).
7. For example, a 1989 amendment to the Minnesota civil neglect statute states:
Neglect includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance ... used by the
mother for a nonmedical purpose, as evidenced by withdrawal symptoms in
the child at birth, results of a toxicology test performed on the mother at de-
livery or the child at birth, or medical effects or developmental delays during
the child's first year of life that medically indicate prenatal exposure to a con-
trolled substance.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556, Subd. 2(c) (West Supp. 1991).
8. See, e.g., In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1989); In re
Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).
9. The District of Columbia civil neglect statute states that a "neglected child"
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or alcohol use is damaging her existing children (over whom the
court may already have established control), so that as soon as the
current fetus is born, the court can take jurisdiction of the infant as a
neglected "imminently endangered" child.
Except where a statute gives direct authority to a court to establish
jurisdiction over a pregnant woman,10 information about fetal devel-
opment will be introduced in court only after the birth of a child in
order to relate the endangering behavior of the mother to the dam-
aged condition of the infant.
A. Drug Tests of the Mother
. Evidence of a pregnant woman's drug or alcohol use can come from
tests of her body fluids - typically urine, in the case of drugs, or
blood, in the case of alcohol. Breath can also be tested for volatile
substances like alcohol and solvents; saliva is an additional, less
usual, medium for testing. Scientists do not accept hair as a testing
medium. While alcohol can most effectively be tested in blood or
breath, urine has come to be the common medium to test for illicit
drugs. This is chiefly because an inexpensive enzyme immunoassay
test has been developed, called EMIT (an acronym for Enzyme Mul-
tiplied Immiunoassay Technique), manufactured by the Syva
Company.
An unfortunate reliance on the results of the EMIT test has arisen
in many courts" which ascribe to the test greater powers of divina-
tion than scientists or even the company that produces it feel are jus-
includes one "who is in imminent danger of being abused and whose sibling has been
abused." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9)(E) (1981).
The Florida civil neglect statute describes "neglect" to include permitting a child to
live in an environment of deprivation when that causes "the child's physical, mental,
or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being signifi-
cantly impaired." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(37) (West 1988).
Other states have other formulas to encompass prospective neglect.
10. In Minnesota, the government can exercise jurisdiction over a pregnant sub-
stance-using woman through the welfare laws, by first offering her drug treatment and
then civilly committing her to treatment if she refuses to accept the offer. Restrictions
on the pregnant woman occur through mandatory testing of pregnant women who are
suspected of drug use and mandatory reporting of all positive urine toxicologies. For
complete provisions of the Minnesota law, see Omnibus Crime Bill, ch. 290, Art. 5, H.F.
No. 59 (1989).
11. United States v. Jones, 548 A.2d 35, 39-46 (1988). But see National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.1986), rev'd, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990), which makes favorable reference to a drug-
screening procedure mandating confirmation of EMIT tests by GC/MS. This case ref-
erences the EMIT test as 97% to 99% accurate.
tified. An enzyme immunoassay test alone, without confirmation by
another method of analysis, has at least a 5% chance of yielding a
false positive result.12 In addition, some commentators say that false
negatives occur up to 50% of the time,'3 because a relatively high
concentration of the drug must be present to be detected at all.
In broad outlines, immunoassay urine tests measure changes in the
amount of light that the urine sample absorbs when it is attached to
antibodies or a chemically-tagged reagent. The cloudiness of the sam-
ple is compared to a calibrated response of a known amount of the
drug. If it is cloudier than the control sample, it is considered a posi-
tive test; if it is less cloudy, it is labeled negative.14 This simple urine
test should be considered to be a drug screen from which the positive
samples are selected for further testing.
Among a number of different confirmatory tests currently avail-
able, a combination of gas chromatography and mass spectrometry
(GC/MS) is considered to be the most practical and specific. Nitro-
gen or helium transports the vaporized drug or drug metabolite
through a gas or metal column; if the drug or drug metabolite is pres-
ent an electric signal is given.' 5 The immunoassay test is thus
double-checked by a method that is completely different and much
more precise than the immunoassay. It is also an expensive proce-
dure, making courts disinterested in footing the bill for criminal sus-
pects, and throwing a financial burden on hospitals, insurance
companies, and patients.
A greater problem with GC/MS is that interpretation of the results
is an art, not a science, requiring high levels of skill, competence, at-
tention to detail, and experience, with both the instruments and test
procedures involved. In one expert's opinion, only forensic toxicolo-
gists certified by the Board of Forensic Toxicology, or persons certi-
fied in Toxicological Chemistry by the Board of Clinical Chemistry,
would absolutely qualify to interpret results. On a case-by-case basis,
physicians and medical scientists might also be shown to have the
knowledge, experience, and training to interpret the results.16 This
view throws into grave contrast the undiscriminating way that deci-
sions are made to separate families and imprison people based on the
immunoassay urine screen itself.
12. See Drug Testing for Fed. Employees Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Operations
of the House Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1
(1987) (testimony of Lawerence H. Mike).
13. Greenblatt, Urine Drug Testing, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV. 651, 657 (1988-89).
14. See SYVA COMPANY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SYVA AND DRUG
ABUSE TESTING (unpublished manuscript available upon request from Syva Company).
15. Dubowski, Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. J. 416, 479-84
(1987). The author is Distinguished Professor of Medicine and Director of Toxicology
Laboratories at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center.
16. Id. at 486.
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In sum, positive urine toxicologies, even when properly confirmed,
do not yield information on how much of the drug was taken, when
the drug was ingested, how long ago the drug was taken, or whether
it has been used chronically. Moreover, a drug test cannot distin-
guish between passive and intentional ingestion.17 As different drugs
and drug metabolites are excreted at different rates from the body
(for example, metabolites of cocaine may stay in the system forty-
eight to seventy-two hours, marijuana can be detected for up to two
weeks and alcohol is excreted almost at once), a urine toxicology in-
dicates only that some of the drug at issue was taken some hours or
days before the test was performed.
It is no wonder then, that urine toxicologies have such limited use
in predicting drug-related problems in the newborn. Of course, when
the urine toxicology is positive, the neonatologist will look for im-
pairment in the newborn. However, more sweeping indicators are
needed if impairment from drugs or alcohol ingested early in the
pregnancy is to be discovered. The most helpful indicators consist of
skillfully taken medical and drug histories,'8 observations by the ob-
stetrician and prenatal health care workers, and admissions by the
pregnant woman, who is usually anxious to provide for the coming
infant.
Where drug tests are part of the evidence in a civil neglect case,
attorneys will be alert to fourth amendment problems. The fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. Invasive procedures, like those required to ob-
tain blood19 and urine,2 0 have been deemed to fall within "searches
and seizures." Whether or not seizing urine is "reasonable" depends
on whether there is probable cause to believe that a wrong against
society has been committed, that it can be proved through the test,
and that the government's need for it outweighs the individual's right
to privacy. "Probable cause" may be proved either before the search
and seizure, when a search warrant is obtained, or in the absence of a
search warrant, when the issue arises as to whether the results are
admissible in court.
17. Id. at 527.
18. Chasnoff, Drug Use and Women: Establishing a Standard of Care, 562 ANNALS
N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 208 (1989).
19. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (drawing blood held to be in-
vasive, yet excusing officer from first obtaining a search warrant based on fact that the
alcohol would dissipate in the time required to obtain a warrant).
20. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
The drama and punitive nature of a fourth amendment search and
seizure issue is considerably diminished when one realizes that the
fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, only with regard to government actions. Therefore, in
the absence of a right to privacy separately established by the state,
only patients in government-funded hospitals treated by government-
funded physicians would arguably be covered by fourth amendment
protections. 21
In any case, the way around the search and seizure issue is for the
testing agency to obtain the informed consent of the patient. The in-
formed consent contemplated for drug testing is definitely more than
the general consent to necessary medical procedures which all pa-
tients sign as part of the hospital admission form. It is one that is
"unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
any duress and coercion."22 The reason for emphasizing the need for
informed consent for drug testing procedures is that if positive urine
toxicologies are reported to the state agency, the consequences can be
the eventual loss of one's children, if civil or criminal neglect is
proven.
B. Current Pregnancy
In the absence of a positive drug test of the mother, or as addi-
tional information to give weight and meaning to a positive drug test,
inferences about drug or alcohol use in the current pregnancy may be
made from existing medical data. The characteristics described here
can be challenged individually by a parent's defense attorney. That
is, none of these characteristics prove conclusively, by themselves,
that a woman has ingested drugs. Each characteristic may be ex-
plained as having originated in some other way. However, if many of
these factors occur together, a conclusion that there has been drug
use would be difficult for a judge to avoid.
Signs of a drug or alcohol-affected pregnancy typically include poor
weight gain, either an inactive or hyperactive fetus, spotting or vagi-
nal bleeding, and early contractions. These symptoms may be accom-
panied by sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV seropositive
status, and general infections that occur when a person is not receiv-
21. California, for example, does have its own state-protected right to privacy. But
see In re Noah M., 212 Cal. App. 3d 30, 260 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1989) (holding that as long
as a California clinic is not required by law to test, no privacy right is infringed by the
testing policy of a prenatal clinic) (opinion ordered not to be published). By analogy,
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), held that acceptance of Medicaid benefits and
the existence of extensive state regulations were not sufficient state involvement to
subject a private nursing home to the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
22. Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 594 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (citing
United States v. Williams, 754 F.2d 672, 674 (6th Cir. 1985)).
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ing proper care. 23 Evidence of accompanying infections could be
found in the following positive tests:24
* chest X-ray
* tuberculin skin test
* hepatitis B antigen and antibody
* venereal disease reaction level (VDRL) and fluorescent treponema an-
tibody (FrA) test for syphilis
* cervical culture for chlamydia trachomatous
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) antibody screen
cervical, rectal cultures for neisseria gonorrhea
The results of positive tests are recorded in the woman's medical
chart under "Progress Notes," and the report of the positive result it-
self would be included in the laboratory section of the medical chart.
Obstetricians often gain clues to a woman's drug habits by observ-
ing her appearance closely. Lack of neatness and cleanliness, fre-
quent emergency room visits (which may well show anxiety about
the fetus), and late or inconsistent prenatal care are markers. The
patient may look physically exhausted; her pupils may be extremely
dilated or constricted; there may be track marks, abscesses, or edema
on her arms and legs; the nasal mucosae may be inflamed or indu-
rated; and the patient may look physically exhausted overall, and not
be well-oriented. Because of poor nutrition and delayed fetal develop-
ment, the appearance of pregnancy and the woman's own statement
of gestational age may be at odds.25 Notes on the appearance of a pa-
tient would usually be found in the physician's progress notes, espe-
cially those taken in the initial prenatal exam.
The great pitfall in evidence of this kind is that most of these char-
acteristics can also be correlated to poverty or to a lifestyle, for exam-
ple, prostitution. One's age, for example, adolescence, may also be a
factor where casual, unprotected sexual activity may be the standard
among peers. Fear and denial of pregnancy may also account for a
lack of prenatal care. Here we enter into the murky world of envi-
ronmental risk factors. That is, there are certain lifestyles with
which drugs are a frequent, but not inevitable, accompaniment. Re-
cent surveys26 and a 1989 population-based study of one county in
23. Chasnoff, Perinatal Effects of Cocaine, CONTEMP. OB/GYN, 163-179 (May
1987).
24. Id, at 164.
25. Id.
26. Born Hooked.- Confronting the Impact of Perinatal Substance Abuse: Hearings
Before the Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (opening statement of Rep. George Miller).
Florida,27 have shown that drug use is not limited to certain socioeco-
nomic or ethnic groups. Therefore, while these characteristics might
predict a likelihood of drug use, they might also discriminate against
poor, minority women by eliminating from scrutiny women who are
economically better off and who have continued their prenatal care
while their drug and alcohol use remained undetected and unre-
ported. Thus, it must be urged that evidence drawn from this cate-
gory be used very carefully, and probably only in conjunction with
actual proof of drug use, such as a confirmed positive drug test, eye-
witness accounts, or patient admissions.
C Prior Pregnancies and Medical Histories
A pattern in prior pregnancies typical of those associated with drug
and alcohol-exposed infants can be a strong indicator of substance
use when coupled with similar problems in a current pregnancy. A
substance-using woman will often go into labor prematurely. The
membrane or placentae may rupture, there may be spontaneous
abortion or fetal death. Even if the infant survives labor, sudden in-
fant death syndrome may occur, 28 or any of a cluster of symptoms de-
scribed elsewhere in this article. While there may be other medical
explanations for any of these factors, a repetition of these kinds of
births - particularly when accompanied by positive drug tests or
clusters of drug or alcohol-related symptoms in the infants them-
selves - strongly suggests long-term substance use by the woman.
It must be emphasized that the substances which cause this kind of
fetal distress are not necessarily illegal. Cigarette smoking is a signif-
icant cause of low birthweight babies.29 There are prescription
medicines, such as amphetamines used as diet pills, which have the
same effect on the fetus as cocaine. Of course alcohol is not an illegal
substance. Therefore, standing alone, a pattern of miscarriages,
abruptio placentae, fetal deaths, and low birthweight babies cannot
be presumptively correlated with use of an illegal substance.
Medical records which are likely to be the most fruitful sources for
a history of prior pregnancies include the information gathered by
27. Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use
During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,
Florida, NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202 (April 26, 1990).
28. Chasnoff, Burns, Schnoll & Burns, Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 666, 669 (S~pt. 12, 1985); Chasnoff, Prenatal Drug Exposure: Effects on Neona-
tal and Infant Growth and Development, 8 NEUROBEHAVIORAL TOXICOLOGY AND TERA-
TOLOGY 357, 357-62 (1986); MacGregor, Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Adverse
Perinatal Outcomes, 157 AM. J. OB/GYN 686, 686-90 (Sept. 1987).
29. Kuhnert & Kuhnert, Placental Transfer of Drugs, Alcohol, and Components of
Cigarette Smoke and Their Effects on the Human Fetus, 60 N.I.D.A. RES. MONOGRAPH
98, 103-05 (1985); Khoury, Does Maternal Cigarette Smoking During Pregnancy Cause
Cleft Lip and Palate in Offspring?, 143 A.J.D.C. 333, 333-37 (Mar. 1989).
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the physician or nurse at the first prenatal visit. Some hospitals, clin-
ics, or individual practitioners may use a standard check-off chart.
There are certain diseases and medical problems that are so clearly
associated with drug and alcohol use that they can be considered "fel-
low travelers." It must again be stated, however, that the association
is not inevitable and that each of these occurs separately from drug
and alcohol use as well. These diseases and problems include:30
* Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (passed by shared needles,
or through sexual activity)
* Cellulitis (infection of the skin, associated with drug injection)
* Cirrhosis of the liver (associated with alcohol use)
Endocarditis (inflammation of the heart)
* Hepatitis (associated with drug injection)
* Pancreatitis (inflammation of the pancreas, usually associated with alcohol
abuse or injection of drugs)
* Pneumonia (AIDS patients are particularly vulnerable)
In addition, sexually transmitted diseases are part of the medical
pattern, especially for crack-cocaine users. Evidence of these dis-
eases or medical problems would be found in the on-going progress
notes with accompanying laboratory results in the lab section of the
medical record.
III. EVIDENCE OF DRUGS OR ALCOHOL IN THE NEONATE'S BODY
The testing techniques for drugs and alcohol in the newborn are
the same as those already described for testing the mother during her
pregnancy, with one addition. It has recently been discovered that
the first stool (meconium) of the infant is easily tested by radioim-
munoassay and yields very accurate results over the first three days
of life.31 Meconium accumulates gradually in the infant's bowel dur-
ing fetal development and is evacuated predominately after birth.
Thus, the advantage of testing meconium is that it provides a window
to the infant's drug exposure for the two to three months prior to de-
livery, as opposed to the forty-eight to seventy-two hours provided by
neonatal urine toxicology.
The only difficult additional issue with newborns is whether stool
and urine samples can be taken without the permission of their par-
ents. There are two ways to look at this issue, and attorneys will ar-
gue either way, depending on whether they are representing the
30. Chasnoff, supra note 23, at 164.
31. Ostrea, A New Method for the Rapid Isolation and Detection of Drugs in the
Stools (Meconium) of Drug-Dependent Infants, 562 ANNALs N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 372
(1989).
child or the nonconsenting parents. From the child's point of view,
collecting urine or stool arguably is not an invasive procedure. The
infant is not conscious of parting with body fluids. There is no em-
barrassment, and no expectation of privacy.32 It is only the parents
whose privacy could be invaded by an analysis of the drug content in
the infant's bodily wastes. The physician looks at the urine or stool
tests as just one more of the many tests to assure the survival and
health of the infant. While parents may have religious scruples about
replacing an infant's blood with the blood of someone else, 33 there
should be no freedom of religion issues attached to analysis of waste
fluids. However, there may be an argument about whether the tests
are required to save the infant's life, or merely desirable to promote
good health.34
Parents, however, may insist on their right to direct the course of
medical treatment for their children. If the parent has a disagree-
ment with the life-saving measures proposed by the physician, the
physician has recourse to ask the court to appoint a guardian for the
child.35 From the parent's point of view, this is a risky course, be-
cause it brings the entire family under the scrutiny of the court and
may mean that the court ultimately will separate the infant from the
parents.
In the absence of an informed consent for testing the infant ob-
tained from the parents prior to the birth (always a hospital's best
policy), the law is probably weighted on the side of the hospital con-
ducting the test. Federal and state child abuse and neglect statutes,
legislation to reduce infant mortality, and public health laws are in-
dicators of a strong state interest in the infant's well being.
IV. PROBLEMS IN COMMON TO SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS
In the absence of an absolute indication of drugs or alcohol in a
newborn's system, the neonatologist will be alerted to problems if
certain other characteristics occur. Many different substances may
cause a few similar obvious problems. Those substances may include
amphetamines and methamphetamines, cannabis, cocaine, halluci-
nogens, opiates, phencyclidine, sedatives, and alcohol. The character-
32. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (stating that the fourth amend-
ment protects an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy from unreasonable in-
trusions by the state).
33. See Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical
Treatment for Child over Parental Objections Not Based on Religious Grounds, 97
A.L.R.3D 421 (1980).
34. Id.; see also Annotation, Medical Practitioner's Liability for Treatment Given
Child without Parent's Consent, 67 A.L.R. 3D (1989).
35. For a recent discussion of this issue from the parent's point of view, see Moss,
Legal Issues: Drug Testing of Post-Partum Women and Newborns as the Basis for
Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 1990 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1408.
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istics of a drug or alcohol-affected newborn - one might call them
archetypal or common characteristics - include:
* premature birth
* low birthweight
small head circumference
abnormal neurobehavioral development
To the eye, these infants may look normal, but very tiny and vul-
nerable. If there were no obvious indications in the pregnant woman
during prenatal care or at labor that drugs or alcohol were being
used, the obstetrician may have missed a diagnosis of substance use.
This may happen if the mother's drug or alcohol use predates prena-
tal care; if there were no drug or alcohol tests or the tests were nega-
tive; if the woman did not fit any profile for testing in the hospital's
or clinic's protocol.
An infant may be considered premature if born less than thirty-
seven weeks gestational age. A full term infant may be considered of
low birthweight when he or she weighs less than 2500 grams.36 A
small head circumference in a term infant would be less than thirty-
three centimeters. A small head circumference often indicates a
small brain, and thus can imply abnormal or delayed development of
the brain.37
There are a number of ways to measure abnormal neurobehavioral
development. Visually, the neonatologist may be able to see that the
infant is trembling, screaming, irritated, and abnormally responsive
to stimuli (either over-reacting or withdrawing from it). One well-
respected test is called the Brazelton Neonatal Behavioral Assess-
ment Scale (NBAS).38 Using lights, bells, and familiar stimuli such
as placing a blanket on the infant's face, reactions are measured and
a neurobehavioral score is given. For older infants, other develop-
mental assessment tests include the Movement Assessment of In-
fants (MAI), a sixty-five item test that measures muscle tone,
primitive reflexes, automatic reactions, and volitional movements,
and the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. One strategy the at-
36. See SACKSON MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, GUIDELINES
FOR PERINATAL URINE TOxICOLOGY SCREENING (specifying weights and measurements
that indicate prematurity). These guidelines can be found in an appendix to Drug Ex-
posed Infants and their Families: Coordinating Responses of the Legal, Medical and
Child Protections Systems, A.B.A. MONOGRAPH at 97 (1990).
37. Chasnoff, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 28, at 361; Gross, Head Growth
and Developmental Outcome in Very Low-Birth-Weight Infants, 71 PEDIATRICS 70, 70-
75 (1983).
38. BRAZELTON, CLINICS IN DEVELOPMENTAL MEDICINE (1973); BRAZELTON, NEO-
NATAL BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT SCALE (1968).
torney may use is to ask the court to order that such a test be per-
formed. Obviously, either the neonatologist or pediatrician who
performed the test, or an expert who understands the results, would
have to describe the process, explaining how the results compare to
those for a normally developing infant.
V. NEONATE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM NARCOTICS
Today, most drug use involves combinations of drugs and alcohol.
Recently there has been a re-emergence of heroin to extend and
modify the effects of crack-cocaine. While many substance-exposed
infants will show a variety of effects from this drug mixture, there
are certain characteristics particularly associated with withdrawal
from narcotics. Most commonly, the identified narcotic will be her-
oin, methadone, "T's" (so-called, from the brand name Talwin), and
"Blues" (so-called from the color of the drug capsules of
pyribenzamine).
Most evident in the newborn are:3 9
a high-pitched cry
sweating
tremulousness
excoriation of the extremities
gastrointestinal upset
The pattern of an infant who is withdrawing from narcotics will be
hyperactivity and irritability. The excessive movement (rubbing
against bedclothes) causes skin abrasions on the knees, toes, elbows,
and nose. The infant has disturbed sleeping patterns and poor
feeding.
This pattern can be analyzed for a judge in terms of the following
categories:40
Size
small head circumference (less than 33 cm) in a full-term infant (38-42
weeks gestation)
low birthweight (less than 2500 grams)
Emotions
. unpredictable fluctuations
Neurobehavior
hyperactivity
hypertonicity (stiffness of muscles)
high-pitched cry
hyperactive reflexes
restlessness
convulsions (these also occur in babies exposed to barbiturates, sedatives
or cocaine)
* sneezing
Rhinorrhea (runny nose)
39. Chasnoff, ,Newborn Infants with Drug Withdrawal Symptoms, 9 PEDIATRICS
REV., 273, 273-77 (Mar. 1988).
40. Id.
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* sweating
* tearing
• tremulousness
* voracious sucking
* yawning
Gastrointestinal
• fever unrelated to infection
• vomiting
* diarrhea
Skin
* mottling
* abrasions on extremities
Respiratory
Tachypnea (rapid breathing)
meconium aspiration syndrome (resulting when the fetus, due to distress,
inhales amniotic fluid contaminated with meconium)
neonatal pneumonia
An attorney will also be looking for evidence of medicines that are
typically used to treat withdrawal from narcotics. These would in-
clude: paregoric, used to improve sucking and weight gain; Diazepam
(Valium), which suppresses most symptoms of narcotic withdrawal
but which has significant side effects such as depressing the sucking
reflex, complicated by the inability of the infant to excrete it; and
phenobarbital, which is used when a mixture of drugs cause the
symptoms. Phenobarbital also possesses significant side effects, such
as impaired sucking, and fails to resolve the gastrointestinal
problems.41 The neonatal progress notes in the medical records
would describe the narcotic withdrawal symptoms as well as the
medicines prescribed to treat them.
An often overlooked aspect of drug withdrawal symptoms is that
certain symptoms do not manifest themselves immediately after
birth. This has obvious implications for the timing of a petition and
the development of a defense. Depending on when the mother in-
gested drugs prior to her delivery and on how much of the drugs she
took, the full array of symptoms may not be present in the first two
days after birth. Typically, symptoms reach a peak on the third or
fourth day of life and can persist for two or three weeks. However,
the infant may then display a subacute form of symptoms for four to
six months of age, including poor feeding, irritability, slow weight
gain and irregular sleep patterns.42 These subacute symptoms often
peak at approximately six weeks of age. This may affect the decision
41. Id.; see also American Academy of Pediatrics, Neonatal Drug Withdrawal, PE-
DIATRICS 895-905 (1983).
42. Chasnoff, Newborn Infants, supra note 39, at 273-77.
to file a neglect petition. More importantly, however, it serves as a
warning to the attorneys before trial that they should obtain the lat-
est medical records to ascertain whether the symptoms have contin-
ued and are even expanding, or whether their manifestation was
brief and now concluded.
VI. COCAINE-EXPOSED INFANTS
It has already been indicated that a newborn seldom shows symp-
toms that can be exclusively associated with cocaine use. Women
who are substance abusers nearly always mix cocaine use with the
use of alcohol, marijuana, heroin, or any other mixture. The quick
litmus test of substance exposure in the newborn infant is premature
birth, low birthweight, small head circumference, and abnormal
neurobehavioral development. Cocaine-exposed infants fall into the
same pattern. A recent medical study showed that women who had
used cocaine during pregnancy had infants who on average, weighed
ninety-three grams less than infants of nonusers in the same hospital,
were 0.7 centimeters shorter, and had head circumferences that were
0.43 centimeters smaller.43 In the judgment of the authors, this
amounts to a significant difference in the infants of mothers who
were users from those who were not users.
If one searches for a cocaine-exposure syndrome, one finds many
elements of the same pattern found in narcotic withdrawal, as well as
some distinct differences. Broadly stated, the symptoms appear as
follows in newborns and infants, respectively: 44
In the Newborn
irritability
poor feeding patterns
high respiratory and heart rates *
increased tremulousness and startles
irregular sleeping patterns
depressed interactive abilities *
poor organizational response to environmental stimuli
Two differences between narcotic withdrawal and cocaine with-
drawal can be observed: high respiratory and heart rates, and de-
pressed interactive abilities. (The asterisked factors denote those
symptoms specific to cocaine). Whereas cocaine speeds up heart rates
and blood pressure, narcotics may suppress them. High blood pres-
sure and heart rate can result in cerebral and myocardial infarctions,
43. Zuckerman, Effects of Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth,
320 N. Eng. J. Med. 762-68 (1989).
44. Schneider & Chasnoff, Infants Exposed to Cocaine in Utero: Implications for
Developmental Assessment and Intervention, 1989 INF. YOUNG CHILDREN 25-36 (July
1989).
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which may in turn cause death.45 There exists an increased rate of
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome in cocaine-exposed infants, which is
comparable to the rate of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome for heroin
or methadone-exposed infants.46
The second difference is in the depressed interactive abilities. Co-
caine-exposed infants have a tendency to avoid stimuli, to avert their
gazes and withdraw. Thus, when a blanket is placed gently on an in-
fant's face in the NBAS, a cocaine-exposed infant may fall asleep,
while an infant who had not been exposed to drugs would try to
shake the blanket off or cry. While most infants wish to engage in
the world around them, follow moving objects with their eyes, and
interact with their caregivers, cocaine-exposed infants reject such in-
teraction. They do not want to be tightly held, petted, or talked-to;
instead, they prefer to remain in a quiet, dark room. As newborns
develop from neonatal status into infancy, their characteristics tend
to include the following:47
Infant
frequent tremors (especially in the arms)
increased muscle tone (stiff muscles)
prolonged newborn reflexes such as the sucking reflex and the startle
reflex
stiffly held legs
arched back
overly extended postures
irritable
The rigid posture of the infants and their irritability make them
physically difficult to handle and potentially emotionally unsatisfying
to their caregivers. Such infants tend to reject interaction with the
caregiver, and if the caregiver is emotionally needy and requires af-
firmation from the infant, an opportunity for abuse exists. Data on
cocaine-exposure symptoms can be found in the infant's medical
records, under "Physician's Progress Notes." Any consultations pro-
vided by social workers or child protection team members should be
especially noted.
The problems are not over when the child outgrows infancy,
although they could be, if drug use in the mother was light and the
child has a strong genetic makeup and excellent care. Quite often,
however, drug-related symptoms persist at least into the toddler
45. Chasnoff, Perinatal Cerebral Infarct and Maternal Cocaine Use, 108 J. PEDIAT-
RICs 456-59 (1986).
46. Chasnoff, supra note 23.
47. Schneider & Chasnoff, supra note 44.
stage. There is a small but growing body of medical and psychosocial
literature which can inform the attorneys and the court of the
problems that cocaine-exposed children experience. Some of the
more obvious problems include fluctuating emotions and unstable
patterns of attachment (either overly rapid attachment to adults or
an inability to bond). More subtly, their play may show much scat-
tering, batting, and throwing, with little imagination or representa-
tion. These children tend to find it difficult to do more than one
thing at a time, and tend to shift their attention from one activity to
another.48
Only unusual civil cases would begin at the toddler stage and at-
tempt to relate a toddler's symptoms back to birth and infancy. More
typically, information about the toddler's development would be pro-
bative at the neglect review stage, for example, when a determina-
tion is being made about whether the family should be reunited.
VII. FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME
The most striking effect of alcohol on the fetus is the alteration of
facial features on the newborn. Eyelids are turned into an epicanthal
fold, giving a vaguely oriental cast to the features. The nose is short
and turned up so that it may look slightly snubbed. The philtrum be-
tween the lips and the nose - a usually well-marked groove in the
skin - is outlined only slightly. The upper lip is thin and the ears
are placed low on the head.49
These altered facial features make striking evidence in a court-
room, because they are easily presented and easily grasped. In fact,
facial features are keys to problems in other parts of the body. For
example, when such facial dysmorphology appears, physicians know
that it is correlated to a low intelligence quotient (hereinafter IQ).
Although facial dysmorphology is a marker for low IQ, the severity
of IQ impairment is not necessarily correlated to the severity of the
abnormality of features. The average IQ in children with fetal alco-
hol syndrome is seventy, with wide variations. Because the effects of
alcohol on children have been studied for a long time, it is known
that the IQ of a child with fetal alcohol syndrome, in most cases, does
not substantially improve as the child matures.50 Another example is
48. Howard, The Development of Young Children of Substance-Abusing Parents:
Insights from Seven Years of Intervention and Research, 1989 ZERO TO THREE 8-12
(June 1989).
49. Streissguth, Teratogenic Fffects of Alcohol in Humans and Laboratory Ani-
mals, 209 Sci. 353-61 (July 1980). Streissguth, Psychological and Behavioral Effects in
Children Prenatally Exposed to Alcohol, 10 ALCOHOL HEALTH AND REs. WORLD 6-12
(Fall 1985).
50. Streissguth, Neurobehavioral Dose-Response Effects of Prenatal Alcohol Expo-
sure in Humans from Infancy to Adulthood, 562 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 145-46
(1989).
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that the low placement of the ears, and their large, strange shape, in-
dicate problems in the kidneys because the kidneys and the ears de-
velop embryologically at the same time.
Other neonatal characteristics in an alcohol-exposed child
include:51
frequent body tremors
hyperactivity
head turning to left
hand-to-face activity
poor sucking responses
poor emotional control
poor adaptation to negative stimuli
low weight, short length, small head circumference
As neonates grow into infancy, and then into childhood, they may
experience problems with their hearts, kidneys and skeletal
structures.5 2
Children with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), which is the most se-
vere manifestation of alcohol effects, and fetal alcohol effects (FES),
which is the less severe complex of factors, tend to suffer from poor
concentration and attention during their entire lives. Other common
behaviors include a withdrawn attitude in social situations, impul-
siveness, dependency, periods of high anxiety, and sullenness.53
VIII. CONFIDENTIALITY
The potential evidence discussed in this article includes medical
records and the testimony of treating health care providers. The for-
mer include hospital and physician records of pregnant and postpar-
tum women and infants, including prenatal care, other health care,
and drug and alcohol treatment records. Under a variety of laws, this
information is usually confidential and beyond the reach of the state.
Yet this "evidence" is critical to a child protection investigation and
resulting court intervention. Lay witness observations of the parent,
child, and their interactions, are important. They do not, however,
answer the critical questions of: how impaired the infant is, what the
mother's current physical and mental capacity to care for the child is,
and what her prognosis is.54 The answers are often buried under
confidentiality shields. Without answers to these questions, many
51. Streissguth, supra notes 49 and 50.
52. Id
53. 1&
54. The mere fact of drug or alcohol use, by itself, will not usually answer
whether a parent is unfit to care for a child. See In re S.D., 549 P.2d 1190, 1196 (Alaska
1976); In re William B., 73 Md. App. 68, 533 A.2d 16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), cert.
cases of abuse and neglect could not be litigated. Rather than reach
such a draconian result, society has made exceptions to confidential-
ity when the safety of children is at issue. This section discusses the
relationship between confidentiality laws and child abuse and neglect
proceedings, with special attention given to drug and alcohol related
information.
"Testimonial" confidentiality of medical records and communica-
tions, nonexistent at common law, is now recognized by statute or
case law in all states.55 It is a privilege held by the patient. The pro-
vider, absent the patient's consent, cannot reveal confidential com-
munications at trial or during the discovery phase.
The purpose of the privilege is to instill trust in the professional
relationship. Without trust, a patient is less likely to pursue help, or
less likely to be frank, open, and candid with the provider. Absent
such openness, diagnosis and treatment will be less effective.
Many states have extended this privilege to other "helping" profes-
sional relationships, such as with psychiatrists,56 psychologists,57 psy-
chotherapists,58 and social workers.59 Confidentiality in these
relationships may be more critical than in the doctor-client context.
Open disclosure of a mental illness, emotional problem, or drug or al-
cohol abuse, leaves one vulnerable to public ridicule and embarrass-
ment. Confidentiality seeks to avoid these reactions, which may
devastate the protected relationship. As one court stated, "[m]any
physical ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness
by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must
have his patient's confidence or he cannot help him."60 Revelation of
drug use also places the patient at risk of criminal prosecution, or a
young mother at risk of loosing her children.61 Adverse public reac-
tion helps explain why, in the physical disease context, HIV infection
merits special confidentiality consideration.62
In addition to evidentiary privileges, confidentiality requirements
denied, 311 Md. 719, 537 A.2d 272 (1988). In re Phifer, 67 N.C. App. 16, 312 S.E.2d 684
(N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
55. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 98 (2d ed. 1972).
56. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(b) (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1989).
57. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (1989).
58. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1028 (West 1991).
59. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 112, § 135 (West 1983).
60. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. 1955). See also, State v.
Munyon, 240 Kan. 53, 58-59, 726 P.2d 1333, 1337 (1986) (confidentiality is "essential for
the psychotherapist's effective diagnosis and treatment of the patient's mental and
emotional problems").
61. See generally, Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 278 (1990).
62. See generally, Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Informa-
tion: An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 3 VILL. L. REV.
871 (1989); S. Rennert, AIDS/HIV and Confidentiality: Model Policy and Procedures,
1991 A.B.A. 2 (the "interrelationship between confidentiality and discrimination - ef-
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are lodged in numerous federal and state laws, and professional eth-
ics codes. Indeed, this mix of laws and ethics, often with ambiguous
and sometimes conflicting terms, can create confidentiality chaos and
confusion. 63 As a result, programs often misuse confidentiality re-
straints, and tend to err in favor of confidentiality.64 Unfortunately,
this can hinder the supply of services as agencies fail to cooperate
and coordinate their efforts to their fullest abilities.65
At the state level, confidentiality may derive from medical records
acts,66 or laws which regulate different types of medical practices, fa-
cilities, and services. These "nondisclosure" laws67 might cover, for
example, clinical laboratories,68 alcoholism treatment facilities,6 9 fa-
cilities for the developmentally disabled,70 health maintenance orga-
nizations,71 state institutions,72 and mental health facilities.73 Some
laws specifically address confidentiality of certain types of medical in-
formation, such as venereal diseases74 or HIV infection.75 Profes-
sional standards and ethics also support confidentiality. Almost
forts to maintain the former in order to prevent the latter - has been the cornerstone
of public health efforts to control the spread of the disease").
63. [A] review of relevant law and ethics... demonstrates that the available
confidentiality guidance generally fails to satisfy the comprehensiveness test
[i.e., can a physician find an answer to any disclosure question with which he
is faced] .... [E]xisting guidance does not meaningfully address all disclosure
questions that can arise in the modern practice of medicine. As a result, phy-
sicians generally are left to resolve complex confidentiality problems on their
own.
Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection
of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. REV. 255, 266-67 (1984).
64. See Weisberg & Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State Ffforts to Protect
Abused or Neglected Children" The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143, 165,
179 (1984).
65. Lack of agency coordination, often attributed to perceived confidentiality con-
straints, is increasingly cited as a major barrier to services for children and families.
See generally Soler & Shauffer, Fighting Fragmentation:L Coordination of Services for
Children and Families, 69 NEB. L. REV. 278 (1990).
66. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (Deering Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. 4-302 (Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 144.651 (16) (West 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 5-37.3-1 - 5-37.3-11 (1987).
67. This was the term used to describe these laws in WEISBERG & WALD, supra
note 64, which provides an excellent overview of this topic.
68. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-42.39 (West 1978).
69. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2B-20 (West 1987).
70. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-4 (West 1981).
71. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-27 (West 1987).
72. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-5 (West 1987).
73. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.3 (West 1981).
74. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-163 (repealed 1988).
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609 (West 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§§ 2780 - 2787 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
every such standard includes a strong confidentiality pronouncement
as the bedrock of the professional relationship. 76
Similar to the laws of privilege, these ethical principles and nondis-
closure statutes aim to encourage full and frank conversations. Com-
pared to testimonial privileges, these ethical principles are more
comprehensive and stringent. The nondisclosure laws cover more
types of disclosures, bind more persons to confidentiality, (all em-
ployees of a licensed facility and not just professional providers), and
include civil or criminal penalties for improper disclosures. 77 Most
importantly, both ethical standards and nondisclosure laws apply be-
yond the courtroom. Thus, while an evidentiary privilege does not ap-
ply to an act of child abuse reporting, these other restrictions might.
At the federal level, confidentiality provisions typically reside in
funding statutes. Provisions in the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Act,78 the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act,79
and the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act8 O should
be familiar to those who work with children and families. Most ger-
mane to this article are those found in the Drug Abuse Office and
Treatment Act of 197281 and the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970.82
Under these laws, disclosure of a "patient's"8 3 drug and alcohol di-
agnosis, treatment, and referral records are strictly controlled for
"programs"8 4 that receive "federal financial assistance."85 Given the
76. See, e.g., Am. Psychological Ass'n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 633, 635-36 (1981). ("Psychologists have a primary obligation to respect
the confidentiality of information obtained from persons in the course of their work as
psychologists"). See also CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL
WORKERS, app. F, at 482 (available at the Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers, Inc., Silver
Spring, MD) ("The social worker should respect the privacy of clients and hold in con-
fidence all information obtained in the course of professional serv,,ice.").
77. For example, under the federal drug and alcohol treatment acts, violators of
the confidentiality provision may be fined up to $500 for the first breach, and up to
$5,000 per additional offense. 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3(f), 290ee-3(f) (1988). While privilege
laws and ethics standards do not contain penalty clauses for violations, persons may
cite them in tort and contract actions. The New York courts have relied in part on the
evidentiary privilege law to sustain a suit against a physician for unlawful disclosure of
confidential information, based on an implied contract of secrecy. See Doe v. Roe, 93
Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1988).
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1988).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(4) (1988).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (1988).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (Supp. 1990) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4582 (1982)).
83. A "patient" is anyone who applied for or received drug or alcohol services "at
a federally assisted program." 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1990). Records of former patients are
also protected. 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3(d) and 290ee-3(d) (Supp. 1990).
84. Programs which provide drug and alcohol abuse diagnosis, treatment, or refer-
ral for treatment include facilities having either an "identified unit" or "[m]edical per-
sonnel or other staff whose primary function" is to provide these services. 42 C.F.R.
§ 2.11 (1990).
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broad definition of these terms, the acts cover most facilities which
provide special drug or alcohol related services. Furthermore, the
regulations provide a broad definition of "record" which includes ver-
bal communications as well as recorded information.8 6
Like their state law confidentiality counterparts, the federal laws
were meant to be strictly followed because without confidentiality,
"fear of public disclosure of drug abuse or of records that will attach
for life will discourage thousands from seeking the treatment they
must have if this tragic national [drug] problem is to be overcome."8 7
Even the manner for obtaining patient consent to release information
is tightly regulated. Unlike most state laws which fail to specify
which procedures must be followed in order for a patient to waive
confidentiality, the federal laws and regulations enumerate specific
elements for acquiring a patient's informed, written consent.88
Confidentiality, as a statutory phenomenon, is not inviolate.89
While the laws promote confidentiality, none are absolute. Most con-
fidentiality laws contain exceptions for nonconsensual disclosures.
These exceptions derive from compelling societal interests. Thus,
physicians may be required to report persons with certain contagious
diseases to a public health agency, because society's interest to check
the spread of such diseases outweighs the benefit of confidentiality.
Professional ethics also recognize compelling exceptions as well as
legal limitations. The American Psychological Association, for exam-
ple, permits revelations "in unusual circumstances in which not to do
so would result in clear danger to the person or to others." 90 Even
85. Alcohol or drug abuse programs are covered if they directly or indirectly re-
ceive federal assistance. Federal assistance is broadly interpreted, including programs
that are certified as a provider under the Medicare program, assisted by the IRS which
grants tax exempt status or allows income tax deductions for contributions to the pro-
gram, or is a recipient of federal financial assistance, in any form and from any federal
agency, whether or not related to alcohol and drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, or re-
ferral. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(b) (1990).
86. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1990).
87. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 920, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S..CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2072.
88. The patient's consent must be in writing. It cannot be part of a routine medi-
cal records release form or those provided by the commercial form publishers. The
release must include the identity of the parties for whom disclosure is requested and is
to be made, the patient's name and signature, date of execution, extent or nature of
information to be disclosed, and a legend that it is subject to revocation at any time. 42
C.F.R. § 2.31(a) (1990).
89. State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 652-59, 526 A.2d 1283, 1289-93 (1987) (refer-
ring to the federal drug and alcohol confidentiality provisions).
90. Am. Psychological Ass'n, supra note 76, at 635-36. Many states have codified
this exception, permitting breaches where necessary to protect the life or well-being of
attorney-client confidentiality, rooted in common law, may be
breached to prevent the commission of a serious crime, 91 including
child abuse and neglect. 92
Combatting child abuse is a compelling state interest that clashes
with confidentiality laws. Doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, and
others frequently unearth indicators of child abuse and neglect in
their professional capacity. For instance, a child brought to an emer-
gency room with suspicious injuries may suggest abuse;93 the parent,
in turn, may confess the abuse to a therapist; the parent's drug coun-
selor may fear that the parent's abusive addiction prevents the coun-
selor from providing for the infant's minimal needs.
The emergency room physician, therapist, and drug counselor
would not be able to share their suspicions of abuse if silenced by
confidentiality laws and professional codes of ethics. Such a result
would contradict the state's interest in limiting child abuse. Largely
in response to the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act of 1974,9 4 each state has enacted child abuse and neglect report-
ing laws.95 The federal law requires that a state must enact a statute
detailing specific methods of reporting child abuse in order to qualify
for federal funds for child abuse programs.96
Every state, in its reporting law or evidentiary codes, 97 has ex-
the patient or a third party. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1748(6)(c) (West 1980). Failure to report to a third party life
threatening information learned in the course of a confidential communication could
also result in civil liability. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440-
41, 551 P.2d 334, 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26-27 (1976).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1980); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (c)(3) (1980).
92. See Indiana Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1-1986 (1986); Wisconsin
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, E-88-11 (1988). See generally R. THURMAN,
CLIENT INCEST AND THE LAWYER'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY (1985); Stuart, Child
Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 1 GEOR. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 243 (1987).
93. The origins of contemporary child abuse and neglect law can be traced to an
influential article published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
which the battered child syndrome was first described. Kempe, Silverman, Steele,
Droegenmueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962). This
syndrome identifies injuries to children which are inconsistent with the explanation
for their cause given by the caretakers. For example, a spiral fracture of the arm is
highly unlikely to occur from falling out of bed. One year after the publication of this
influential article, California became the first state to require certain persons to report
suspected child abuse. 1963 Cal. Stat. c. 576, § 1, at 1453.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (1988).
95. For an overview of these laws, see DAVIDSON & HOROWITZ, Protection of Chil-
dren and Family Maltreatment, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, 286-94 (R. Horowitz &
H. Davidson ed. 1984).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (1988).
97. The location of the waiver may vary from state to state and may be found in
several places within a particular state's laws. For example, the child abuse reporting
law may waive the privilege for child protection proceedings while an evidentiary code
may cover other types of proceedings. See, e.g., TEx. R. CIv. EVID. 510(d)(6) (Vernon
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pressly opted to favor child abuse reporting over medical confidenti-
ality. The reporting laws specify that certain privileges shall not bar
or prevent the making of a report. Medical, mental health, and social
worker-related privileges are routinely included in this waiver.98 As
a matter of statutory construction, these waivers, which are situation
specific and often post-date medical confidentiality laws, have been
held to defeat state law based confidentiality claims.99 As a result, a
physician who knowingly fails to report suspicions of abuse could
face liability.1°
Under federal preemption, these state statutory waivers, until re-
cently, had little effect upon communications and records protected
by the federal drug and alcohol laws.101 In light of the significant
overlap between substance abuse and child abuse,1 0 2 there existed a
1971) (disclosure of confidential communications may be made when "relevant to any
suit affecting the parent-child relationship").
98. This waiver was encouraged by the federal government. Shortly after passage
of the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect distributed a model act which became the basis for much
state child abuse and neglect reporting legislation. MODEL CHILD PROTECTION Acr
§ 11 (draft 1977). See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.04(B) (1989); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 350-5 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1354(a) (1986). This model act pro-
vided for a waiver of privileged communications. Today, the attorney-client privilege
is the only one that most states still preserve for child abuse reporting. But see supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d 730, 735-36, 539 P.2d 86, 90 (1975); 68 Op.
Wis. Att'y Gen. 342, 346 (1979).
100. All states impose criminal, and in some cases civil, penalties for such failures
to report. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-13 (1986) (up to six months imprisonment or a
fine not to exceed $500); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(4) (Supp. 1989) (class 3 misde-
meanor and "liable for damages proximately caused thereby"). These laws have been
upheld against a variety of constitutional challenges. See, e.g., People v. Cavaiani, 172
Mich. App. 706, 432 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1988) (statute requiring psychologists to report
suspicions of child abuse did not violate the family's right to privacy); State v.
Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 362-64, 788 P.2d 1066, 1070-72 (1990) (statute requiring
religious counselors to report suspicions of child abuse did not violate the counselors'
first amendment free exercise rights).
101. At least one court, however, found that the federal drug and alcohol confiden-
tiality requirements did not preempt a state child abuse reporting law. The court rea-
soned that Congress could not have intended this outcome. State v. Andring, 342
N.W.2d 128, 131 (Minn. 1984). See also Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d at 737, 539 P.2d at 91 (in-
terpreting state reporting law and state alcohol and drug confidentiality acts to enable
the reporting of child abuse without disclosing the substance abuse problem).
102. While the exact contribution of substance abuse to child abuse is unknown,
few would doubt that "overuse of alcohol or other drugs may 'dull cognitive function-
ing'" and make parents "unable to care well for their children, inevitably disregarding
their needs, and produce a typical picture of neglect." STEELE, Violence Within the
Family, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 13 (R. Halfer & C. Kempe ed. 1976). Most would
agree that the "chronic use of alcohol or taking of hallucinogenic drugs can cause se-
vere distortion of mental functioning with delusional thinking and the lowering of the
large and significant loophole which was closed by Congress in
1986.103 Today, persons privy to drug or alcohol prevention and treat-
ment referral records must follow the child abuse and neglect report-
ing law requirements in their states. In effect, this means that
medical and mental health professionals engaged in drug and alcohol
treatment must report reasonable suspicions of child abuse. In the
last few years, several states have even amended their child abuse re-
porting statutes to include drug counselors on the list of mandated
reporters.10 4
In cases where children born in utero are exposed to drugs,105 the
mix of child abuse reporting and confidentiality laws raises two im-
portant questions: first, does evidence of a mother's prenatal sub-
stance abuse or drug exposure in a newborn constitute grounds for a
child abuse report; and second, if it does, how much confidential in-
formation may be revealed in the actual report or during either the
investigatory or judicial phase of a case?
A report based on a mother's prenatal substance abuse or an in-
fant's drug exposure is only mandated under state child abuse report-
ing laws if it may be construed as grounds to "reasonably suspect"106
child abuse or neglect. Legislatures have purposely created a low
threshold for reporting; mandated reporters are asked to err, if they
threshold for the release of violence... including child abuse." Id A prominent child
abuse researcher observed that "researchers in the United States have found consis-
tent relationships between caretaker use and abuse of alcohol and drugs and the abuse
and neglect of children." GELLEs, What to Learn from Cross-Cultural and Historical
Research on Child Abuse and NeglecL An Overview, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: BI-
OSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 27 (R. Gelles & J. Lancaster ed. 1987). In a recent national sur-
vey, many child protection agencies reported that up to 80 percent of their caseload
involves elements of substance abuse. NATIONAL COMM. FOR THE PREVENTION OF
CHILD ABUSE, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES (1990).
See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CRACK
BABIES 6 (1990) (finding similar results).
103. Children's Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 99-401, 100 Stat. 903 (1986).
104. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a(b) (Supp. 1990) (1988 amendments added
"certified substance abuse counselors" to list of mandated reporters); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 50-25.1-03 (1989) ("addiction counselor").
105. For the purposes of this article, the discussion will be limited to child abuse
reports following the birth of a child. To date, no state child abuse law specifically cov-
ers prenatal reporting. Without this requirement, courts have interpreted the report-
ing laws to apply only to post-birth situations. See, e.g., In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App.
3d 23, 29-30, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528 (1981); In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263
N.W.2d 37, 39 (1977). While a 1989 Minnesota law requires a pre-birth report based on
a pregnant woman's substance abuse, it is not made to a child protection agency.
Rather, the report goes to a local welfare department and any involuntary state inter-
vention follows a civil commitment model. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(1) (West
Supp. 1991).
106. The Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, as a condition for
federal child abuse funds, requires states to have provisions for the reporting of known
and "suspected" instances of child abuse and neglect. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1) (1988).
Following enactment of this act, most states use one of the following standards for re-
porting: "reasonable suspicion," "reasonable belief," or "cause to suspect."
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must, on the side of over-reporting. A reporter need not "be sure
that a child is being abused or neglected or to have absolute proof of
maltreatment."107 Nor must a reporter conduct an independent in-
vestigation, make home visits, or interview parents.108 It is the job of
child protection services to conduct such investigations. Rather, the
reporter simply needs an objective basis, which is usually circumstan-
tial, upon which to make a report.109
Whether infant drug exposure constitutes this objective basis has
been a subject of dispute.'no A few state child abuse reporting laws
specify that an infant born drug-exposed must be reported."' The
majority of state laws, however, are silent on the subject, leaving it to
the individual reporter's discretion.112 The reporter must determine
107. D. BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 55 (1990). See also Thomas v. Beth
Israel Hosp. Inc., 710 F. Supp. 935, 941-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (statutes providing immunity
for child abuse reporters are based upon reasonable cause to suspect abuse, not actual
or conclusive proof of abuse).
108. Opponents of mandatory reporting based solely on the fact that a child is born
manifesting signs of drug exposure would place some preliminary fact finding obliga-
tions on the reporting source. To date, only California has legislatively gone this route.
1990 amendments to the state child abuse and neglect reporting law specifically pro-
vide that a positive toxicology screen of an infant is not by itself reasonable suspicion
of child abuse. Rather, an assessment of the needs of the mother and child must be
made; if there is an indication of risk to the child, then a report must be made to the
county child welfare department. SB 2669, 1990 Legislative Session.
109. D. BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 56 (1990).
110. See generally supra, note 6. One argument against mandatory reporting is that
it will deter women from seeking prenatal care and hospital deliveries, and that it in-
terferes with the doctor-patient relationship. It should be noted that interference
with therapeutic relationships has been historically cited as a reason why physicians
underreport abuse and neglect, notwithstanding legal mandates to the contrary. See,
e.g., G. ZELLMAN & R. BELL, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND, CASE CHARAC-
TERISTICS, AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY RESPONSE IN MANDATED CHILD ABUSE REPORTING
30-31 (1990); Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child
Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 479 (1977-78).
111. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23, para. 2053 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A
(West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562(2) (West Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 846(A) (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-504 (1961). These
laws are usually based upon either a positive toxicology of the infant, or more often
medical or behavioral symptoms of drug exposure. The drugs are limited to "con-
trolled substances" and do not typically include drugs properly taken under medical
supervision. A few states include evidence of fetal alcohol syndrome as a reportable
condition. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1(1)(a) (Burns Supp. 1987).
112. In a study of 12 cities, the reporting policies of hospitals with regard to
newborns born "drug exposed" varied widely, although none seemed to mandate re-
ports unless required by state law. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 102. "Discretionary" reporting is hardly unique to the
situation of drug exposed newborns.
The child abuse reporting laws provide only limited guidance concerning the
whether the condition falls within the reporting act's general defini-
tion of abuse and neglect."l3 Absent additional factors, such as a
mother who is violent or mentally unable to care for the infant's
minimal needs, a failure to report will not likely result in liability to
the mandated reporter. Conversely, a report based solely on prenatal
drug use or infant drug exposure will likely be protected by good
faith immunity, which has been statutorily extended to reporters in
all states.1 4 Thus, at this time, most abuse and neglect reporting
laws permit, but do not require, a report based upon an infant's drug
exposure or a mother's prenatal drug use.
How much confidential information should be revealed in the child
abuse report or during the investigation or judicial proceeding is a
more difficult question. The decision often hangs on the wording of
the relevant child abuse and neglect law, the party whose records are
at issue, and the purpose for which the information is being sought.
Child abuse and neglect reporting laws are often imprecise regard-
ing reporting requirements, sharing of information, and confidential-
ity waivers. Consequently, the following critical questions recur:
How much confidentiality, if any, is waived?1 15 Does the waiver
factors that make an incident reportable [references omitted]. Vague,
nonbehavioral definitions of what constitutes abuse and neglect under the law
leave reporters considerable latitude in deciding whether the available evi-
dence translates into a reasonable suspicion that abuse or neglect has occurred
and, if so, whether or not it is reportable.
G. ZELLMAN & R. BELL, supra note 110, at 2 (citations omitted).
113. All child abuse and neglect reporting laws define abuse and neglect for report-
ing purposes. The definitions tend to be expansive and even vague to capture as many
possible instances of child abuse and neglect as possible. Kentucky, for example, fol-
lows a common scheme by defining "abused or neglected child" as one whose
health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when his parent ... :
inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical or emotional injury by
other than accidental means; creates or allows to be created a risk of physical
or emotional injury to the child by other than accidental means... does not
provide the child with adequate care, supervision, food, clothing, shelter and
education or medical care necessary for the child's well-being.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). Under this definition,
the mandated reporter must decide whether the woman's prenatal drug use inflicted
an injury on the child or places the child at risk of future injury.
114. This immunity is another condition of state eligibility for federal child abuse
funds. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1)(B) (1988). Since reporters are not obligated to conduct
independent investigations, any reasonable, articulable suspicion should support the
good faith requirement. For example, the fact that a minor tested positive for a sexu-
ally transmitted disease, by itself, would merit a report and subsequent immunity from
liability, even when a later test proved negative. Criswell v. Brentwood Hosp., 49 Ohio
App. 3d 163, 165, 551 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (1989).
115. Two California cases demonstrate how literal readings of abuse and neglect re-
porting laws can limit disclosure. In California, the courts have decided that the law
does not compel disclosure beyond the initial report. Thus, if a client or patient made
revelations subsequent to this report, it would remain confidential, unless it involved
new incidents of abuse. People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 513-14, 668 P.2d 738, 744,
194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 437 (1983); People v. John B., 192 Ca. App. 3d 1073, 1077-79, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 659, 662-63 (1987).
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mandate cooperation in child abuse and neglect investigations?" 16
Does it require the surrender of confidential records? Does such a
waiver apply to the mother's confidential information, or just the
child's?117 Does the waiver extend to criminal proceedings concern-
ing the child's well-being?"s These questions present just a few of
the problems raised by the confidentiality laws. Surprisingly, there is
little case law addressing these issues. Therefore, in the absence of
precise statutory authority, holders of confidential information tend
to preserve confidences. Thus, agencies must resort to subpoenas and
court compelled disclosures or do without this critical data. This situ-
ation has led some proponents to argue for greater clarity in state
law and easier access for a child protection agency to obtain critical
information.119
At this time, some generalities can be made. The child abuse re-
port itself need not include the child's or mother's medical records.
116. While the laws mandate certain persons to report suspected abuse or neglect,
they are largely silent as to a person's obligation during an investigation. Thus, while
many laws grant good faith immunity to those who cooperate with an investigation.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2059 (Smith-Hurd supp. 1990), they do not com-
pel cooperation. Additionally, while most child abuse and neglect laws waive confiden-
tiality for the purposes of reporting or testifying, they tend to be silent with respect to
participating in an investigation. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(2) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31--11-8 (Burns Supp. 1987). Thus, a holder of
confidential information may logically conclude that, in light of the express confidenti-
ality waivers, the legislature did not intend to cover the investigatory phase. Even
when confidentiality is waived during this stage, interpretational difficulties may con-
cern whether it is limited to persons who reported the abuse, or includes anyone else.
117. Some reporting laws seem to bind only professionals who directly care for or
provide services to a child. In turn, the waiver of confidentiality provision, which ap-
plies to mandated reporters, could be limited to these professionals. In such states, one
can question whether a professional who learns of possible child abuse through treat-
ing a parent is obliged to make a report. See, e.g., Op. Wis. Att'y Gen., OAG 10-87
(1987). Other states seem to limit the waivers to the extent that it allows reporters of
child abuse to testify; thus, the waiver might not cover other persons. See also In re
O.L., No. N-528-87 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. Nov. 16, 1988) (1990 WL 237-333). Still
other reporting laws waive testimonial privileges with respect to evidence "relating to
the condition of a child." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1554(a) (1986). Whether a mother's
drug use would fall under this exception is far from clear.
118. This is one of the more litigated questions. Courts tend to favor disclosure in
all related judicial proceedings unless the statute clearly excludes this outcome. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Leas, 303 N.W.2d 414, 419-20 (Iowa 1981) (statute waiving privilege in
juvenile court proceedings applied to termination of parental rights case); State v.
Brydon, 626 S.W.2d 443, 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("any judicial proceeding" included
criminal cases concerning abuse and neglect). See generally, Annotation 44 A.L.R. 4th
649 (1986).
119. See Weisberg & Wald, supra note 64, at 195; Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child
Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV. 496, 586-
87 (1988).
Most state laws require that the report include statements identify-
ing the child, injuries, and information which might help explain the
source or cause of the injuries. 20 The federal drug and alcohol laws,
which now permit covered programs to report suspicions of abuse,
are consistent with this viewpoint. While covered programs may re-
port abuse, they cannot surrender protected records as part of the
routine reporting process.121
Some states, by statute, expressly authorize agency access to the
child's medical records as part of the investigatory process, without
the need for court orders or parental consent. 122 A few courts have
concluded that hospitals, as part of the child abuse report, are obliged
to turn over the child's medical records. 2 3 These statutes and hold-
ings reflect both logical and practical considerations.
Logically, it would make little sense to allow a parent accused of
child abuse to delay or interfere with the child abuse investigation by
withholding consent to release the child's medical records.124 Courts
might well interpret the reporting law's purpose, to protect chil-
dren, 25 together with the child protection agency's mandate, to con-
duct investigations into the causes of a child's injury, to reach this
result. As a practical matter, few child protection agencies have sub-
poena power or may obtain a subpoena from court, without first
bringing an abuse and neglect petition.126 If the agency had to resort
to the court each time it sought a child's records, it would delay in-
vestigations (at potential peril to the child) and a new burden would
be added to an already crowded child protection docket.127
120. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11167(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (West 1988).
121. See infra note 138.
122. See, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(C) (1989 & Supp. 1990) (person having
custody or control of minor's medical records shall make them available to law en-
forcement or child protective services worker investigating child abuse; such records
are confidential and may be used for investigatory and judicial purposes); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 350-1.1(a) (1990); MD. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5-711 (Supp. 1990).
123. See Schuyler County Dep't of Social Serv. v. Schuyler Hosp. Inc., 144 Misc. 2d
250, 543 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1989).
124. See, e.g., In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 900, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (1989).
125. Most child abuse and neglect reporting laws, as their sine qua non, identify the
protection of children from harm at the hands of their parents or caretakers. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a (West 1988).
126. Currently few states have statutory authority for a child protection agency to
seek subpoenas for the express purpose of conducting an investigation. See Hardin,
Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63
WASH. L. REV. 493, 587 (1988).
127. Contributing to the growth of these dockets has been the skyrocketing of child
abuse and neglect reports. In the 1980s, these reports more than doubled, from 1.15
million in 1980 to 2.4 million in 1989. Additionally, the last half of the decade wit-
nessed a surge in foster care cases. In June 1987 there were an estimated 280,000 foster
care cases; by June of 1990 this number increased 29% to 360,000. These cases demand
even more court time to allow for periodic court reviews of each child in foster care.
While court resources have not kept pace with either development, critics charge that
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At trial, confidential communications and records concerning the
child are admissible, over objections of privilege, under most state
waiver of confidentiality provisions.12m This is supported by good
faith immunity granted to persons who testify in these matters.'2 9
Access to confidential information concerning the mother is more
difficult. The amount that should be revealed in a child abuse report
must take into account both the confidentiality statutes and reporting
laws. The purpose of reporting abuse is to alert child protection
agencies to dangerous situations so that an investigation may com-
mence. 130 To initiate this response, the report may be limited to the
identity of the allegedly abused child and the basis for the suspicion.
At the same time, the details of confidential information may be
largely withheld. For example, a psychiatrist who treated a patient
for many years, and only recently had cause to suspect that the pa-
tient was abusing his child, should not be required to reveal client
communications that are unrelated to the suspected incidents of
abuse. If the investigating agency requires more, and the mother will
not waive her confidentiality right, it will probably have to obtain a
court subpoena.
Once at trial, however, a stronger case can be made that the
judges are unable to conduct proper hearings and meet the mandates of the Federal
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. See Hardin, Ten Years Later: Implemen-
tation of Public Law 96-272 by the Courts, in THE ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD
WELFARE AcT OF 1980: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 58-59 (North American Council on
Adoptable Children, ed. 1990).
128. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.512 (West 1986) (communication privileges do
not apply in child abuse situations); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(B) (West 1990) (evi-
dence related to the neglect or abuse of a child shall not be excluded on the basis of a
physician, patient, or husband-wife privilege). Even if confidentiality of medical
records is overcome, the records are not admissible unless they satisfy business records
requirements. For a review of admissibility requirements in the context of medical
records in a child abuse proceeding, see State v. Ziegler, 14 Wash, 2d 533, 789 P.2d 79
(1990).
129. Most states today extend this good faith immunity to persons who testify in
judicial proceedings arising from abuse and neglect. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556(4)
(West 1990) (extending immunity to one who cooperates with the investigation); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(1) (Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1990). Depending on the wording
of the statute, this may apply to all judicial proceedings related to abuse and neglect,
or just those related to the child protection case.
130. State child abuse and neglect reporting laws typically require the child protec-
tion agency to commence an investigation shortly after a report of abuse is received,
and if necessary take steps to protect the child. This statutory obligation has resulted
in courts finding that these agencies owe a duty to children for purposes of tort litiga-
tion. See, e.g., Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987); Dep't of Health
and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1988); Coleman v. Cooper, 366
S.E.2d 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
mother's confidentiality and waiver rights can be overcome. This
may be based on either an express statutory waiver for child abuse
cases or a showing that such waiver is in the child's best interest.13'
The latter basis comports with the view that certain societal interests
in the proper resolution of litigation outweigh particular confidential-
ity concerns. 132 The importance of correct dispositions in abuse and
neglect133 and child custody cases, 3 4 have caused courts to waive the
parent's claim of privilege when his or her mental or physical abili-
ties are questioned.
The question remains, however, whether state law reporting re-
quirements and waivers of confidentiality apply to drug and alcohol-
related records. The answer is twofold: yes, if the information is not
protected by the federal drug and alcohol confidentiality require-
ments; no, if it is. These federal laws cover patient information of a
"program" as defined in the acts and regulations. Under 1987
changes to the regulations, the definition of "program" no longer ex-
tends to records of substance abuse diagnosis, treatment, or referral
made at a general hospital or health care facility, unless this service
was provided by a special drug or alcohol unit or by identified sub-
stance abuse personnel. 3 5 Thus, for example, a newborn treated for
drug exposure only in a neonatal intensive care unit and not by staff
whose primary function is to provide substance abuse treatment, is
not covered by the federal law. Similarly, a pregnant woman receiv-
ing routine prenatal care from her obstetrician, cannot expect protec-
tion under federal law for results of urine toxicology tests the doctor
may have conducted. While the federal law might not apply, the wo-
man may still have protection under a state confidentiality or privi-
lege law, unless waived for child abuse purposes. 3 6
131. See, e.g., In re M.C., 391 N.W.2d 674 (S.D. 1986) (statute on its face, coupled
with the best interests of the child, resulted in waiver of the mother's physician-pa-
tient privilege).
132. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton's rev. ed. 1961).
133. See, e.g., In re Bender, 366 Pa. Super. 363, 531 A.2d 504 (1987).
134. See, People v. Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1963) (patient-phy-
sician privilege maybe disregarded to protect best interests of the child); M. v. K., 186
N.J. Super. 363, 452 A.2d 704 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (statute granting privilege
held unconstitutional in child custody cases); D. v. D., 108 N.J. Super. 149, 260 A.2d 255
(1969) (flexibility required when applying patient-physician privilege in child custody
cases).
135. 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1990). See also 52 Fed. Reg. 21796 (1987).
136. See, e.g., In re Teddler, 150 Mich. App. 688, 389 N.W.2d 149, rehg denied, 426
Mich. 873, 394 N.W.2d 926 (1986). The court upheld the mother's psychologist-patient
privilege in a termination of parental rights action, finding that because the psycholo-
gist's testimony did not concern a report of child abuse or provide evidence of neglect
or abuse, the privilege was not waivered under the reporting act. In so holding, the
court noted that there was no "good cause" exception in the state law for abrogating
the privilege. But cf In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (applying
good cause exception in the federal drug confidentiality law).
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If the information is protected by federal confidentiality laws, how-
ever, any state law requiring that the infant's or mother's drug and
alcohol records be shared with the investigative agency or courts does
not apply.137 Comments to the federal regulations expressly state
that "although the new law excepts reports of suspected child abuse
and neglect from the statutory restrictions on disclosure and use, it
does not affect the applicability of the restrictions to the original al-
cohol and drug abuse patient record maintained by the program."'138
In other words, it is sufficient for a program to report suspicions of
abuse without turning over the records.
The mother's and child's drug or alcohol records may still be ob-
tained, however, under the court-order exception found in both the
federal drug and alcohol acts.139 These laws permit nonconsensual
disclosures by a court order upon notice to the treating institution, af-
ter a finding of good cause. In deciding whether to compel disclosure,
the court must "weigh the public interest and the need for disclosure
against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship,
and to the treatment services."'140 There is, to date, little case law
that has looked at this issue in a child abuse or neglect context.
Those that have permit disclosure of parental drug/alcohol informa-
tion, provided it is material and relevant to the issue in question. 141
In authorizing disclosure, courts have held that the "public inter-
est" in ensuring the safety and welfare of allegedly abused and ne-
glected children outweighs any possible injury to either the patient
or to the physician-patient relationship.142 Additionally, courts have
observed that the potential "injury to the patient" is minimized in
civil abuse and neglect actions because the records are not generally
open to public inspection; public ridicule and embarrassment is thus
less likely to occur.143 Courts have applied this same rationale to
137. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(6) (1990).
138. 52 Fed. Reg. 21, 796-01 (1987). See also 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(c)(6) (1990).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3(b)(2)(C) (1990). See also 42 U.S.C. 290ee-3(b)(2)(C) (1990).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3(b)(2)(C) (1989), 290ee-3(b)(2)(c). See also 42 C.F.R. § 2.64
(1990).
141. See, e.g., In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (records must be
necessary and material to issue of neglect) (1980); In re Dwayne G., 97 Misc. 2d 333, 411
N.Y.S.2d 180 (records containing evidence of alcoholism were necessary and material
in neglect case) (Faro. Ct. 1978). In re Doe Children, 93 Misc. 2d 479, 402 N.Y.S.2d 958
(counselor's testimony must be relevant and material to issue of neglect) (Fain. Ct.
1978). In re Stephen F., 118 Misc. 2d 655, 460 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Faro. Ct. 1982) (however,
records must be material, necessary, and relate to the relevant time period).
142. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. at 120, 293 N.W.2d at 741.
143, Id. This factor was cited favorably in Susan W. v. Ronald A., 147 Misc. 2d 669,
child custody cases, where the public interest argument is potentially
weaker. In a Louisiana custody dispute, the father had sought the
mother's medical records pertaining to her treatment for drug abuse.
The trial court denied the request, citing the federal confidentiality
provision. In reversing this decision, a Louisiana appellate court ob-
served that the state joint custody law, which depended upon paren-
tal cooperation, put the parents' mental health in issue. Analogizing
to the federal drug law's court-order exception, the appellate court
found that the trial court could protect confidentiality by inspecting
the records in camera, soliciting related testimony in chambers, and
sealing the records.144
If any doubt existed that the interests in child protection trump
the patient's right to confidentiality, the 1987 changes in the federal
drug and alcohol confidentiality acts' regulations put it to rest. The
regulations permit court-ordered disclosures if necessary to protect
against or prevent a significant threat to life or serious bodily injury.
Under the new regulations, "circumstances which constitute sus-
pected child abuse and neglect"145 are now identified as such a situa-
tion. Additionally, on the criminal side, the regulations now permit
court-ordered disclosure where it is "necessary in connection with in-
vestigation or prosecution of an extremely serious crime, such as one
which directly threatens loss of life or serious bodily injury, including
... child abuse or neglect."146 Comments to these new regulations
make crystal clear that the "therapeutic benefits [of confidentiality]
cannot take precedence over [these] circumstances."'147 In short, the
regulations now strongly support, but do not require,148 the release of
drug and alcohol records in civil and criminal child abuse cases.
Before authorizing disclosure, the regulations require that certain
558 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1990), where the court ordered that a mother's drug treat-
ment records be submitted for in camera inspection in a matrimonial action.
144. Richard v. Tarzetti, 510 So. 2d 1361 (La. Ct. App. 1987). See also Susan W, 147
Misc. 2d 669, 558 N.Y.S.2d 813 (important public interest in ensuring a proper decision
on custody outweighs any potential injury to the parent or to the physician-patient re-
lationship so that father was entitled to in camera inspection of wife's alcoholism treat-
ment records). But see In re Comm'r of Social Serv. of N.Y. v. David R.S., 55 N.Y.2d
588, 436 N.E.2d 451, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1982) (public interest in drug records is not over-
come in paternity action where litigant desires evidence to impeach the credibility of
another, especially when such evidence is cumulative of other testimony).
145. 42 C.F.R. § 2.63(a)(1) (1990).
146. 42 C.F.R. § 2.63(a),(2) (1990).
147. 52 Fed. Reg. 21, 796-01 (1987).
148. While the federal law permits court ordered disclosure of confidential infor-
mation in extraordinary circumstances, it does not compel this result. 42 C.F.R.
§ 2.3(b)(1) (1990). A court must still determine whether disclosure is appropriate
under the procedures and criteria described. See in-fra notes 154-65 and accompanying
text. The decision is left to the judge's discretion and will not be overturned absent
manifest injustice or a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Rollins, 203 Conn. 641, 526
A.2d 1283 (1987).
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procedures be followed.149 Also, as with any evidentiary matter, the
records must be shown to be relevant to the issue in dispute.
Both the woman's prenatal and infant's drug records may meet the
relevancy standard in a child abuse and neglect case. In cases of
abuse and neglect, the health of the child is often at issue. Courts
have held that, when a parent's fitness to raise a child is at issue, the
parent's physical and mental health records are relevant,150 and that
the best interests of the child overcome any objection based on the
physician-patient privilege.IS1 While a woman's drug use cannot sus-
tain a child abuse report prior to birth, once the child is born courts
have found prenatal drug use probative of future abuse and ne-
glect. 5 2 In some jurisdictions, this may even establish a prima facie
case of abuse and neglect.153
As stated above, the regulations set forth explicit procedures and
criteria to be used in obtaining court-ordered disclosures. Addition-
ally, a court order alone cannot compel disclosure. The order must
be accompanied by a subpoena or other similar legal mandate.54 If
the request does not have both parts, a drug or alcohol "program"
cannot respond in any way that would reveal that an identified indi-
vidual is or has been diagnosed or treated for alcohol or drug
abuse. s55 The program's response must be noncommittal, for exam-
149. See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., In re Estate of Becton, 130 Ill. App. 3d 763, 474 N.E.2d 1318 (1985)
(parent's drug use is relevant to issue of custody if it is shown to affect the parent's
mental and physical health and relationship with the child).
151. See, e.g., Koshman v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 294, 168 Cal. Rptr. 558
(1980); People ex rel. Chitty v. Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1963); D.
v. D., 108 N.J. Super. 149, 260 A.2d 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. Chi. Div. 1969).
152. See In re Stephen W., 211 Cal. App. 3d 629, 271 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990); In re
Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1989); In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 157
A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y App. Div. 1990); In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111,
293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). The rationale for these cases is that the court need not wait for
harm before intervening. An analogy is made to the situation where courts will admit
evidence of prior abuse of a sibling as probative of future harm to a child. See, e.g., In
re D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981); In re William B., 73 Md. App. 68, 533 A.2d 16 (1987).
153. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 802-18(2)(c) & (d) (Smith-Hurd 1990).
154. 42 C.F.R. § 2.61(a) (1990).
155. 42 C.F.R. § 2.13(c)(2) (1990). For example, a response might include "records
of a patient other than the substance abuse records, plus a custodian of records affida-
vit... [stating] that no effort was made to determine the existence or nonexistence of
records maintained in connection with substance abuse diagnosis, treatment or refer-
ral, with [a] citation to the federal law." Slaven, W7ho Holds the Key? Lawyers' Access
to Drug and Alcohol Abuse Treatment Records, 23 Amz. B.J. 8, 37 (1988).
Since noncompliance with a court subpoena can result in some kind of sanctions,
one author suggests the following procedure that his office has used. Upon subpoena
of confidential information, the presiding judicial officer of the court is advised of the
ple, by giving the inquiring party "a copy of [the drug and alcohol
confidentiality] regulations and advising that they restrict the disclo-
sure of alcohol or drug abuse patient records," without affirming that
a specific individual has records that are confidential.156 If a program
only treats drug or alcohol problems, then it may not even acknowl-
edge that the person ever applied for or received services.
If the party still seeks the records, he must apply to the court, in a
John Doe request,157 and give the patient and holder of the confiden-
tial communication notice and the opportunity to respond.158 A hear-
ing on the request will be held in chambers or by another means
ensuring privacy, and may include an in camera inspection of the
records.159 The criteria for ordering disclosure differ depending upon
whether the request is for criminal or noncriminal purposes. In
either case, the court must weigh the public interest against the pa-
tient and patient-physician interests, as required by the statutes. 160
However, as stated above, the 1987 regulations put the public interest
first with respect to child abuse and neglect. In criminal cases, the
court must additionally determine whether the crime involved is "ex-
tremely serious."'161 Again, the regulations remove the guess work
by identifying child abuse and neglect as such a crime.162
The court must also determine whether there are other effective
ways of obtaining the information. In the case of prenatal drug
abuse, it might be argued that a mother's admission or family mem-
bers' acknowledgement of her substance abuse would suffice. While
this would identify her as a substance abuser, it would not necessarily
answer other critical questions potentially relevant to her fitness to
care for the child. Her confidential record might provide, for exam-
ple, her history of both drug use and participation in treatment and
her knowledge of the effects of substance abuse on fetal
development.
Finally, in keeping with the purpose of confidentiality, the regula-
tions place limits on the court's disclosure order. The order must
federal law and regulations, without identifying any patients by name. The portions of
the record believed to be confidential are marked by the program and its attorneys and
transmitted in a sealed envelope to the presiding judge, together with a letter describ-
ing the subpoena and advising that a response is being made by submission of the
sealed record with parts marked which may be privileged. No reference is made to
drug or alcohol abuse, to the statutes, nor to any communication with the attorney is-
suing the subpoena. Anderson, New Federal Regulations Concerning Confidentiality
of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Records, 3 THE HEALTH LAw. 2 (1987).
156. Id.
157. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.64(a), 2.65(a) (1990).
158. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.64(b), 2.65(c) (1990).
159. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.64(c), 2.65(c) (1990).
160. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.64(d)(2), 2.65(d)(4) (1990).
161. 42 C.F.R. § 2.65(d)(1) (1990).
162. Id.
[Vol. 18: 279, 1991] Medical Evidence
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
limit disclosure of the record to parts relevant to the underlying in-
quiry and to persons who have a need for the information. 16 3 In civil
matters, the court must also take steps to shield disclosure from pub-
lic view, such as sealing the record.164 Public disclosure for criminal
matters can also be limited within constitutional limitations.165
IX. CONCLUSION
This article provided an overview of the medical evidence of prena-
tal substance abuse. No attempt was made to quantify its probative
value or to suggest that such evidence, by itself, can sustain either a
child protection agency's' 66 or juvenile court's finding of abuse or ne-
glect.167 To the contrary, such evidence is but a piece of the puzzle.
Whether the mother is or will be abusive or neglectful takes into ac-
count a variety of other factors.
These factors are increasingly being identified in protocols and
agency policies. For example, the New York State Department of So-
cial Services, in 1990, adopted the following policy:
Evidence that a newborn infant tests positive for a drug or alcohol in its
bloodstream or urine; is born dependent on drugs or with drug withdrawal
symptoms, fetal alcohol effect or fetal alcohol syndrome; or has been diag-
nosed as having a condition which may be attributable to in utero exposure to
163. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.64(e)(1)-(2), 2.65(e)(1)-(2) (1990).
164. 42 C.F.R. § 2.64(e)(3) (1990).
165. 42 C.F.R. § 2.65(e)(3) (1990).
166. Following a report of abuse or neglect, child protection agencies will conduct
an investigation. As a result of such an investigation, the agency will decide whether
or not it believes abuse occurred (often termed "substantiated" or "confirmed" case) or
did not occur ("unsubstantiated). Sometimes, due to lack of evidence, the agency can
not make a determination ("uncertain"). These agency decisions are unrelated to judi-
cial findings of abuse or neglect.
167. There is, admittedly, some statutory and case law authority that such evidence
may establish a prima facie case of neglect. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6
(Smith-Hurd 1977). In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1989).
Other cases, while purporting to reach this conclusion, seem to rely upon additional
evidence. See, e.g., In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (mother's prenatal drug use and her failure to be enrolled in a drug
treatment program at the time of the petition, is sufficient to show neglect due to her
repeated use of the drug and actual impairment of the child). Furthermore, at this
time there is no substantive crime of using drugs while pregnant, notwithstanding
some legislative efforts to the contrary. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1146, Reg. Leg. Sess. (1990
Ga. Laws) (would have made the distribution of a controlled substance to an unborn
child a crime); H.R. Res. 90, 57th Gen. Sess. (1990 Colo. Laws) (would have made pre-
natal substance abuse of a controlled substance or assisting a pregnant woman to use
such a substance criminal child abuse); H.R. Res. 90-976, Reg. Sess. (La. 1990 Laws)
(would have made it unlawful to give birth to an infant who is addicted to heroin or
cocaine as a result of prenatal use). The Louisiana bill went on to require the testi-
mony of a least two neonatologist as to prenatal exposure to sustain a conviction.
drugs or alcohol is not sufficient, in and of itself, to support a determination
that the child is maltreated .... [or] to take protective custody of such a
child.1 6
The policy goes on to state that such evidence constitutes grounds
for a child abuse report. Upon receipt of such a report, a child pro-
tective services investigation must occur. This investigation is to "as-
sess the ability of the parent to care for the child,"169 taking into
account the infant's needs and the parent's ability or capacity to meet
these needs. This policy is especially notable since it appears to be
an about face. Prior to this policy, various child protective agencies
in New York were notorious for removing newborns from their
mothers' care solely on this medical evidence of prenatal substance
abuse.170
The policy is also consistent with a growing consensus, as other
agencies, associations, and study groups set forth their policies and
procedures in this area. The Washington State Department of Social
and Health Services' policy, for example, requires its child protective
services to accept reports based solely on medical evidence of prena-
tal substance abuse, once the child is born. The policy, however, goes
on to enumerate additional factors the investigation must address, in-
cluding the history and pattern of parental substance abuse, parental
mental health and physical condition, the home environment (includ-
ing presence of other substance abusers), the physical condition and
medical needs of the child, support available to the parent(s), prior
history of abuse and neglect by parents, and chemical dependency
testing and monitoring of the parents.171
The National Association of Public Child Welfare Administrators,
in a January 1991 policy statement, likewise took this more cautious
approach, stating that:
A positive drug test of a newborn or the child's mother will precipitate a re-
port to the public CPS agency to determine if the child is at risk of harm or in
need of protection. A positive drug test is a factor in such an investigation,
but should not be used in and of itself as the sole basis for court action or the
involuntary removal of the child.
1 7 2
168. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., Child Protective Servs. Program Man-
ual, app. at I-11 (June 27, 1990) (unpublished memorandum).
169. Id.
170. See Baquet, Hearings on Neglect Upheld In Newborn Cocaine Cases, N.Y.
Times, May 30, 1990, at B3. An earlier New York City agency policy was described as
"generally [requiring] a neglect hearing whenever a hospital informs the Human Re-
sources Administration that a child has been born with illegal drugs in its system." Id
See also Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 28, in
which a similar policy was attributed to Nassau County, N.Y.
171. See WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVS., TREATMENT
PROTOCOL FOR CHEMICAL-USING PREGNANT WOMEN 78 (Jan. 1990). See, OREGON DEP'T
OF HUMAN RESOURCES, WOMEN, DRUGS AND BABIES: GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL AND
PROTECTIVE SERVICES RESPONSE TO INFANTS ENDANGERED BY DRUG ABUSE DURING
PREGNANCY, 23-27 (Oregon Children's Services Division 1989).
172. National Ass'n of Public Welfare Admins., Guiding Principles for Working
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In short, the emerging view tends to support the use of the medical
evidence of prenatal drug use for purposes of reporting child abuse
and neglect, but limits its role in the proof of neglect and abuse to
that of one factor among many.
with Substance Abusing Families and Drug-Exposed Children: The Child Welfare Re-
sponse at 3 (Jan. 1991) (unpublished report). This view is also shared by many other
groups that have examined this issue. See, e.g., Ohio Task Force on Drug-Exposed In-
fants, Final Report at 11 (May 1990) (unpublished report).

